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Disaster communication governance and public trust: the case of TEPCO
Abstract
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) Risk Governance Framework identifies five interdependent phases, of which the final phase, Communication, is of the utmost importance because
effective communication is the key to creating public trust in disaster risk management. Extant
government reports on the 2005 Hurricane Katrina and the 2009 Victoria bushfires in Australia (2009
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010) provide evidence that disaster communication governance
deficits contribute to the slow disaster response and recovery operations and the erosion of public trust in
government disaster management.
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insufficiently defined governance model for interorganizational collaboration
under EE conditions, and (b) soft variables such as incompatible
organizational cultures and practices. The governance model for EE response
and recovery management needs to be negotiated and determined prior to the
EE, otherwise frictions in the response efforts are inevitable. Also, while the
technologies and organizational procedures might be technically sound, soft
factors related to different or diverging organizational cultures and informal
practices may interfere and make collaboration problematic and reduced in
effectiveness.
Information and Information Needs. In EE management, information is the
most valuable resource to responders, particularly, when geo-coded,
current/updated, filtered/focused to task, and responder/purpose specific.
While information asymmetries among EE responders are inescapable, the
distribution of information should be open and forthcoming. Computermediated communication and social networking services have emerged as
self-organizing complements to traditional channels for sharing and
disseminating information. While high accuracy and quality of information
are keys to trust in the shared information among responders, the principle of
“satisfacing” in terms of timeliness relative completeness in EE response
management has been emphasized.
Interoperability and ICTs. Institutional (enterprise-type) architectures,
which integrate and help interoperate diverse ICTs, allow for virtual
command and control centers across collaborating agencies and the use of
shared knowledge bases in an EE. Due to built-in robustness and redundancy
such ICTs can also maintain two-way communication even when major
communication infrastructures are incapacitated. Geographical Information
Systems are the backbone of such systems. In recent EE, computer-mediated
communication via social networking systems have begun to play a major as
self-organizing mechanism for informing the general public but also as a
feedback mechanism conveying important EE-related information to
responders in a timely fashion.
As case in point, the panel presentation assesses the readiness of field
operations in a local government in terms of the capacity of switching from
daily routine operations to EE response management along the lines of the
four major areas of interest.

*****

A CASE STUDY RESEARCH ON TROUBLE AND FAILURE OF
INFORMATION SYSTEM IN AN EMERGENCY PERIOD OF
DISASTERS
Michinori Hatayama and Megumi Ando
Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan

After Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake various emergency management
systems based on ICT were developed and installed to local government.
However information issues in an emergency period of disasters were not
fixed up completely and in addition some new problems have arisen from
new technology.
Our goal is to develop reliable information system which can use
immediately after disaster and in this paper we consider factors of troubles
and failures of information system under disaster to clarify the vulnerabilities.
In this presentation we report troubles and failures cases in the Great East
Japan Earthquake and past disaster in Japan and try to classify into
categories.
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DISASTER COMMUNICATION GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
TRUST: THE CASE OF TEPCO
Akemi Takeoka Chatfield, Ph.D.1 & Mary Barrett, Ph.D.2
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University of Wollongong, Faculty of Informatics, School of Information Systems &
Technology; akemi@uow.edu.au
University of Wollongong, Faculty of Commerce, School of Management & Marketing

The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) Risk Governance
Framework identifies five inter-dependent phases, of which the final phase,
Communication, is “of the utmost importance” because effective
communication is the key to creating public trust in disaster risk management
(IRGC, 2005, p. 14). Extant government reports on the 2005 Hurricane
Katrina (GAO 2006; GAO 2007; GAO 2010) and the 2009 Victoria bushfires
in Australia (2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010) provide
evidence that disaster communication governance deficits contribute to the
slow disaster response and recovery operations and the erosion of public trust
in government disaster management. A better understanding of the
relationship between disaster communication governance during crisis times
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and public trust is critically important to improve vertical and lateral disaster
information sharing practice. This paper addresses this research need by
exploring two objectives: (1) to understand the Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO) disaster communication governance over the failures at
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plants in Japan, “the most prepared of nations”
(Time 2011) through case study analysis, archival analysis, and corporate
website content analysis; and (2) to compare and contrast the TEPCO
communication governance practice vis-à-vis the research literatures on
leadership in crisis, corporate governance, and information technology (IT)
governance to enhance disaster communication governance and build public
trust.
TEPCO owns and operates the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (6
nuclear plants), Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (4 nuclear plants),
and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (7 nuclear plants). The
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station’s safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)
triggered the shutdown of the facility when it was struck by a magnitude 9.0
earthquake on March 11, 2011. However, the backup generator damaged by
the tsunami failed to cool the over-heating reactors and fuel rods, releasing
radiation leak. Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency rated the
nuclear disaster at a level 5, which is classified as a crisis.
TEPCO is aware of earthquake risks on its nuclear plants. The KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Station in Niigata prefecture was struck by the 2007
Niigata Chuetsu-Oki earthquake. The ground motion sensors recorded “the
site experienced nearly twice the ground shaking that was considered in the
plant design”, exceeding 0.5 g (Global Risk Miyamoto 2007, p. 60). TEPCO
reported no major structural damage to the nuclear plants. The Kyodo News
Agency reported that about 100 drums containing radioactive waste material
had fallen, releasing radiation leak. While TEPCO downplayed the reported
radiation risk, the seven nuclear plants were shut down after the leak was
verified.
Despite the previous earthquake risk experience, TEPCO leadership during
the recent nuclear crisis was slow in sharing disaster information with key
stakeholders. According to Japanese and international mass media, both
Japan’s concerned citizen groups and international nuclear experts claimed
that TEPCO and Japan’s central government were underplaying the crisis’
severity and misrepresenting information about the nuclear disaster risk.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano admitted that “information had not
been shared quickly enough.” (Talmadge & Yamaguchi 2011) The paper

discusses the key findings and insights by addressing the two research
objectives.
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CHAIR: WILLIAM PETAK

LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND NETWORK: A
MICROFOUNDATION OF EFFECTIVE DISASTER RESPONSE IN
RURAL CHINA
Jian Cui
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh;
Jic53@pitt.edu

Providing effective emergency responses to large scale disasters in China has
become one of the key responsibilities of national, provincial and local
governments. Besides, more and more nonprofit organizations and business
agencies, both local and international, have committed themselves to
participate from different perspectives into emergency management.
However, it is also one of the most complex endeavors with great amount of
uncertainties for every single actor or collaborative initiatives to work
together effectively. The feasibility and effectiveness of the policy is not only
challenged by the de facto segregation between public sectors and other
actors, but also by the asymmetry of essential information, the heterogeneity
of local communities, as well as the emerging complexity driven by
interconnected and adaptive local people who spontaneously respond to such
disasters in different patterns. Considering such factors, even a most in-time,
well-resourced, and highly-integrated policy can be easily crippled in the
community level, especially in rural areas where local government officials in
such complex settings have much less incentives or capability to pay
attention to.
This paper intends to optimistically provide a rationale for understanding the
microfoundation of effective disaster response in rural China after Wenchuan
Earthquake. Adopting E. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) Framework and the philosophy of network analysis into the case, a
model of local leadership and emerging network within the community has
been established. On the one hand, it describes the dynamic structure which
integrates the interactive residents, local government officials, and external
aid organizations together; one the other hand, it explains a possible bottomup process of learning which helps to maintain their community’s resilience
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